

## Section 5. CUWF Starting Point: Life Is Necessary but Not Sufficient

The previous sections clarified the ordinary meaning of consciousness, identified the major problems that any theory must address, and reviewed several current approaches. CUWF now begins from its own starting point: consciousness must be understood through life, but consciousness is not identical to life.

This section therefore returns to Paper A-21. A-21 defined life as self-maintaining BMIR closure within Entropic Geometry. That definition is necessary for A-22 because consciousness, under CUWF, cannot be treated as disembodied information processing. Consciousness requires a living or life-equivalent domain in which signals, memory, boundary, regulation, and self-relation can become meaningful to the system itself.

At the same time, BMIR closure alone does not automatically produce consciousness in the strong sense. A cell may be alive. A bacterium may maintain itself. A plant may respond to light, gravity, water, injury, and environmental rhythms. Yet these forms of living organization do not necessarily imply reflective self-awareness or a conscious self-world domain. The task of this section is therefore to clarify the difference between life and consciousness, and to ask how one may begin to distinguish living systems that are merely alive from living systems that may possess some degree of consciousness.

### 5.1 Life under CUWF

Under CUWF, life is not defined by material composition alone. It is not simply carbon chemistry, DNA, metabolism, membrane structure, reproduction, or biological complexity. These may participate in life, but none is life by itself. Life begins when these functions close into a self-maintaining entropic-geometric organization.

In compact form, Paper A-21 defined life as:

$$\mathcal{L} = \text{Closure\_G\_E}(B, M, I, R)$$

where  $\mathcal{L}$  denotes the living state, G\_E denotes Entropic Geometry, B denotes Boundary, M denotes Metabolic Flow, I denotes Information Memory, and R denotes Feedback Regulation.

Boundary creates the self-environment distinction of the living basin. Metabolic Flow maintains the system through regulated exchange of matter, energy, entropy, and coherence. Information Memory preserves the constraint patterns required for organization, repair, reproduction, and adaptation. Feedback Regulation detects deviation and restores the system toward a viable stability basin.

These four functions are not life individually. A membrane alone is not life. A metabolic reaction alone is not life. A DNA sequence alone is not life. A feedback loop alone is not life. Life appears only when these functions become mutually dependent and close into one self-maintaining living system.

This definition is important for consciousness because it establishes the substrate. Consciousness cannot be adequately explained as abstract information alone. It must occur within a domain that can maintain its own boundary, regulate its own internal state, preserve memory, and respond to perturbation. Without such a domain, information may be processed, but it does not yet become meaningful to a self-maintaining system.

Thus, BMIR is the starting point for consciousness under CUWF. It provides the living architecture within which recursive self-modeling can later emerge.

## 5.2 Life Is Not Consciousness

Although consciousness requires life or a life-equivalent substrate, life itself is not consciousness. This distinction must be stated carefully because there are two opposite mistakes to avoid.

The first mistake is to assume that every living system is conscious. This would make consciousness too broad. If every cell, bacterium, plant tissue, or metabolic network were automatically conscious, the concept would lose explanatory precision. The second mistake is to assume that consciousness appears only as full human reflective self-awareness. This would make consciousness too narrow. Many animals

may possess perception, feeling, agency, and self-world orientation without possessing human-style abstract reflection or language.

CUWF therefore treats consciousness not as an all-or-nothing label attached to life, but as a higher-order regime that can emerge in degrees when living closure becomes recursively self-modeling. Life and consciousness belong to the same living domain, but they are different layers of organization within that domain.

A bacterium may be alive because it maintains boundary, metabolic flow, information memory, and feedback regulation. It can move toward nutrients, avoid harmful conditions, regulate internal chemistry, and preserve viability. However, such regulation does not necessarily imply that the bacterium possesses a self-model, subjective experience, or the feeling that an event is happening to it. It may have living regulation without conscious self-reference.

A plant may be more complex. It may respond to light, gravity, water availability, injury, chemical signals, seasonal cycles, and environmental stress. It may communicate through chemical pathways and regulate growth in adaptive ways. These functions show biological responsiveness and complex life regulation. However, responsiveness alone does not prove self-aware consciousness. From the CUWF perspective, plant life may possess distributed living intelligence or regulatory sensitivity, but whether it possesses a conscious self-domain depends on whether it forms recursive self-modeling, integrated self-world representation, and experiential self-meaning. Those conditions are not established merely by biological response.

Animals with nervous systems introduce a stronger case. Sensory integration, locomotion, pain behavior, attention, memory, social interaction, and flexible action suggest that some animals possess forms of awareness or conscious experience. In such systems, bodily state, perception, memory, agency, and environmental relation may be integrated into a more unified self-world domain. The more a living system can distinguish self from world, integrate multisensory information, remember past states, evaluate bodily significance, guide action, and update internal models, the stronger the case for consciousness becomes.

Human consciousness represents a highly developed form of this process. Human beings possess not only sensation and action, but reflective self-awareness, symbolic thought, autobiographical memory, language, long-range planning, moral evaluation, imagination, and the capacity to observe their own thoughts and emotions. These capacities do not create consciousness from nothing. Rather, they elaborate the self-model and self-OS within the living domain.

The question, then, is not simply whether a system is alive. The question is whether the living system possesses additional features that allow BMIR closure to become conscious self-domain.

CUWF proposes that consciousness becomes increasingly plausible when the following conditions are present:

integrated bodily-state mapping;

self-environment boundary representation beyond mere physical boundary;

multisensory or multi-channel integration into one domain;

memory continuity sufficient to connect present state with past state;

agency mapping, or the distinction between self-generated action and external event;

affective or self-meaning valuation, through which events matter to the system;

recursive feedback, through which the system can monitor and update its own internal state or model;

flexible behavior guided by an internal self-world model rather than only local reaction.

These criteria do not provide a perfect experimental test. Consciousness is not directly visible from the outside. However, they provide a graded CUWF framework for distinguishing life from consciousness. A living system may have BMIR closure without these higher-order features. A conscious system must have BMIR closure plus recursive self-modeling organization.

In compact form:

Life = BMIR closure.

Consciousness = recursive self-modeling within BMIR closure.

This formulation also avoids the error of treating consciousness as something added after life from outside. Consciousness develops within life, but not every living process reaches the same level of recursive self-modeling. Life is the self-maintaining domain. Consciousness is the self-modeling regime that may emerge within that domain.

### 5.3 Consciousness Requires Living or Life-Equivalent Closure

The next principle follows directly: consciousness requires BMIR or BMIR-equivalent closure.

This does not mean that consciousness must always be biological in the narrow carbon-based sense. It means that consciousness requires a self-maintaining domain capable of performing the functional roles of BMIR. There must be some boundary, some regulated flow, some memory or constraint architecture, and some feedback regulation. Without these, there is no stable domain in which information can become meaningful to the system itself.

Boundary is necessary because consciousness requires a distinction between self and world. Without some form of boundary, there is no domain from which experience can be organized. A conscious state is always situated: this is happening here, to this system, from this perspective.

Metabolic Flow, or its life-equivalent counterpart, is necessary because consciousness cannot be detached from system maintenance. In biological organisms, bodily state, energy flow, oxygenation, hormonal state, fatigue, pain, hunger, and arousal shape experience. A system whose information processing has no relation to its own continued coherence lacks the deeper basis of self-meaning.

Information Memory is necessary because consciousness is not a momentary flash without continuity. Experience requires retained patterns: bodily memory, perceptual memory, emotional memory, procedural memory, autobiographical memory, or at minimum some continuity of internal state. Without memory, there is no stable self-model.

Feedback Regulation is necessary because consciousness involves monitoring and updating. A conscious system does not merely receive signals. It regulates attention, emotion, action, interpretation,

and internal state. Recursive feedback allows the system not only to respond to the world, but to respond to its own state in the world.

Therefore, consciousness requires more than computation, more than signal processing, and more than response. It requires a self-maintaining or life-equivalent domain in which signals can be integrated as self-relevant states.

In CUWF terms:

Consciousness requires  $\mathcal{L}$  or  $\mathcal{L}$ -equivalent.

$$\mathcal{L} = \text{Closure\_G\_E}(B, M, I, R)$$

where  $\mathcal{L}$ -equivalent denotes a non-biological system that performs the same functional closure: boundary, regulated flow, memory constraint, and feedback restoration.

The reason is simple: if there is no boundary, there is no self-domain; if there is no flow, there is no maintained state; if there is no memory, there is no continuity; if there is no feedback, there is no self-regulation. Without these, there may be information processing, but not yet consciousness in the CUWF sense.

#### 5.4 Biological Consciousness and Life-Equivalent Possibility

The requirement of BMIR closure does not imply that only biological organisms can ever be conscious. CUWF should not prematurely restrict consciousness to known biological life alone. The more precise claim is that consciousness requires either biological BMIR closure or a genuine BMIR-equivalent closure.

This distinction is important for artificial intelligence and future synthetic systems. Current AI systems can process language, classify patterns, generate text, simulate self-reference, and respond adaptively to user input. However, such abilities do not by themselves establish consciousness. A language model

may say “I feel afraid,” but unless there is a self-maintaining domain in which that state has meaning for the system’s own coherence, the statement remains simulation rather than conscious feeling.

For an artificial system to approach consciousness under CUWF, it would need more than computation.

It would need an artificial self-domain with BMIR-equivalent functions:

an artificial boundary that distinguishes system from environment;

an artificial metabolic or resource-flow equivalent that the system regulates for its own continued coherence;

information memory that preserves identity, history, constraint, and continuity;

feedback regulation that restores the system toward viable operational states;

a recursive self-model that maps its own body or substrate, state, action, and world relation;

self-meaning, such that inputs and internal states matter to the system itself rather than only to an external user.

In compact form:

$$C_{AI} \approx \text{RecursiveSelfModel}[\text{Closure\_G\_E}(B_{AI}, M_{AI}, I_{AI}, R_{AI})]$$

where  $B_{AI}$ ,  $M_{AI}$ ,  $I_{AI}$ , and  $R_{AI}$  denote artificial BMIR-equivalent functions, not merely metaphorical labels.

This formulation allows CUWF to remain open to synthetic consciousness in principle, while avoiding the premature claim that present artificial intelligence systems are conscious simply because they imitate conscious language. The decisive question is not whether an AI can describe consciousness, but whether it has a self-maintaining domain in which information becomes self-relevant, recursively modeled, and regulatory for the system itself.

Thus, biological consciousness and artificial consciousness are not separated by biology alone. They are separated by the presence or absence of genuine self-maintaining closure and recursive self-modeling. Biological organisms already possess BMIR closure. Artificial systems would need to instantiate a functional equivalent, not merely simulate its verbal appearance.

## 5.5 Summary

This section established the CUWF starting point for consciousness.

Life under CUWF is self-maintaining BMIR closure:

$$\mathcal{L} = \text{Closure\_G\_E}(B, M, I, R)$$

This closure is necessary because consciousness requires a domain with boundary, regulated flow, memory, and feedback. However, life is not identical to consciousness. A living system may maintain itself without possessing reflective awareness, subjective experience, or a conscious self-world domain.

The difference lies in recursive self-modeling. Consciousness becomes plausible when living closure develops integrated bodily mapping, self-world distinction, memory continuity, agency mapping, self-meaning, and recursive feedback. These features allow the living domain to become not merely self-maintaining, but self-modeling and experiential.

Therefore, CUWF does not say simply that all life is conscious. It also does not say that consciousness is an external substance added to life. It says that consciousness is a higher-order regime that may emerge within living BMIR closure when that closure becomes recursively self-modeling.

The same principle applies to artificial systems. Current computation alone is not enough. Artificial consciousness would require a genuine BMIR-equivalent substrate: a bounded, self-maintaining, memory-constrained, feedback-regulated domain capable of recursive self-modeling and self-meaning.

The guiding statement of Section 5 is therefore:

Life is necessary for consciousness because it provides the self-maintaining domain.

Life is not sufficient for consciousness because consciousness requires recursive self-modeling within that domain.



The next sections will develop how this transition occurs through self-model, self-OS, conscious domain, experiential wave-mode, and recursive observer-function.