

## Section 3. Events Humans Cannot Order

*(The Central Communication Axis of Paper A-8)*

Up to this point, causality has appeared reliable, intuitive, and deeply justified by human experience. The mind has good reasons to trust it. Yet this trust depends on a hidden assumption that has not yet been exposed clearly enough: that events themselves are inherently ordered, and that perception merely witnesses this order as it unfolds.

Section 3 is designed to challenge that assumption in the most direct and least abstract way possible. Rather than beginning with formal theory, it begins with access. The key question is simple: when human beings say that one thing happened before another, are they describing the intrinsic structure of the event, or only the order in which information about the event became available to them?

To answer this, the section examines one and the same structural issue from three different perceptual angles. The event itself does not need to change. What changes is only how the event is accessed, separated, delayed, or reconstructed by the observer. Once this distinction is seen clearly, causal intuition is not refuted by force. It begins to collapse under the weight of its own inconsistency.

The importance of this section for Paper A-8 is therefore central. If the order of cause and effect can vary with access conditions while the underlying event remains structurally the same, then causal sequence cannot be fundamental. It belongs to perception before it belongs to ontology.

### 3.1 Three Perceptual Access Modes to the Same Event

Human experience suggests that events arrive in sequence. Yet sequence is not always a property of the event itself. In many cases it is a property of the observer's access route to that event. The same type of physical occurrence may be encountered under three perceptual modes: one in which the

supposed cause is accessed first, one in which event components are encountered together, and one in which the apparent effect is encountered before its inferred source.

These three cases are not chosen because they are exotic. They are chosen because they are ordinary enough to reveal something decisive. If all three are possible without changing the basic physical fact that an event occurred, then causal order cannot simply be read off from the event. It is mediated by access.

### 3.1.1 Type I — Perceived Cause Before Effect

*(The Case That Reinforces Intuition)*

This is the most familiar and reassuring case—the one that trains causal intuition from the beginning. A glass is thrown to the ground, it strikes the floor, and it shatters. A switch is pressed, the circuit closes, and the light turns on. A door is pushed, force is applied, and the door opens. In each instance perception encounters an apparently clean order: one action appears clearly before the resulting change.

Because the initiating movement is accessed first and the transformation is accessed second, the mind infers a causal structure with almost no friction. The relation feels obvious precisely because the sequence is easy to perceive. Human beings are therefore naturally trained to regard this order as a property of the event itself rather than as a property of perceptual access.

But the critical point is subtle. What is later labeled the cause is, at first, simply what perception happened to register first. The conclusion that the event itself is intrinsically ordered goes beyond what perception alone has established. Type I therefore reinforces causal intuition strongly, but it does not yet prove that causal order belongs to reality independent of the observer.

### 3.1.2 Type II — Perceived Simultaneity

*(When Ordering Begins to Break Down)*

In the second perceptual mode, the observer can no longer cleanly separate what is taken to be the cause from what is taken to be the effect. A balloon bursts close to the body: sound, pressure, and visible rupture are registered together. A cracked glass breaks beneath one's foot: impact, vibration,

sound, and fragmentation arrive as one experiential unit. A mild electric shock is received: pain and muscular response appear without any clearly isolable sequence.

Nothing essential about physical occurrence has changed in these cases. What changes is the observer's ability to impose order. Perception no longer encounters a clean temporal gap between initiating condition and resulting change. The event is apprehended as a single cluster rather than as a clearly staged sequence.

This case is important because it reveals that causal order is not guaranteed by the event itself. Cause and effect may still be spoken of, but their ordering is no longer directly readable in experience. The event remains real, yet the sequence that seemed so obvious in Type I begins to dissolve. Causality is not yet eliminated, but its dependence on perceptual conditions becomes visible.

### 3.1.3 Type III — Perceived Effect Before Cause

*(When Causal Intuition Fully Collapses)*

The third mode is the most destabilizing because it reverses the order on which ordinary intuition depends. A driver stopped at a red light feels a violent impact from behind and only afterward sees the crushed vehicle that struck them. An object falls from above and strikes someone before the source is seen. A building suddenly loses power: darkness arrives first, while the blown fuse or tripped breaker is discovered only later.

In all such cases, the physical event has already completed itself before the observer constructs a causal narrative. The outcome is encountered first. The source is reconstructed afterward. No amount of delayed understanding alters the fact that the structural transition has already occurred.

This exposes a decisive point for the whole paper. Events do not wait for causal interpretation. Human interpretation arrives late. The observer first encounters an accomplished state and only afterward organizes available information into a before–after account. What is usually called causality is, in such cases, plainly retrospective.

### 3.1.4 What These Three Cases Reveal

Placed side by side, the three perceptual modes reveal something profound. The physical event need not be fundamentally different across the cases. What differs is the order in which information becomes accessible to the observer. In Type I, initiating action is accessed first. In Type II, multiple aspects arrive together. In Type III, the resulting state is encountered before its inferred source.

From this comparison a critical conclusion follows: sequence is not a stable property of events as such. It is a property of perception under limited access conditions. The event itself may be structurally complete while the observer receives its components in different orders depending on distance, delay, embodiment, sensory channel, or inferential reconstruction.

This means that causal ordering is not embedded in reality in the simple way ordinary intuition assumes. It is assembled by the observer from the order in which information is received. The same event can support different causal narratives without contradiction because causality, at least in its familiar human form, is not what the event is. It is how the event is understood after access has been organized into a sequence.

This marks the first irreversible fracture in classical causal intuition. Once event order and access order are no longer treated as identical, the ordinary certainty of cause preceding effect can no longer be regarded as foundational. The next sections will show that this fracture is not exceptional. It points toward a deeper structural truth: reality does not need to wait for human sequence in order to complete itself.